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Abstract
In this paper, we derive a formula for the optimal investment allocation (derived from a dynamic
programming approach) in a defined contribution (DC) pension scheme whose fund is invested in n
assets. We then analyse the particular case of n = 2 (where we consider the presence in the market
of a high-risk and a low-risk asset whose returns are correlated) and study the investment allocation
and the downside risk faced by the retiring member of the DC scheme, where optimal investment
strategies have been adopted. The behaviour of the optimal investment strategy is analysed when
changing the disutility function and the correlation between the assets. Three different risk measures
are considered in analysing the final net replacement ratios achieved by the member: the probability
of failing the target, the mean shortfall and a Value at Risk measure. The replacement ratios
encompass the financial and annuitization risks faced by the retiree. We consider the relationship
between the risk aversion of the member and these different risk measures in order to understand
better the choices confronting different categories of scheme member. We also consider the
sensitivity of the results to the level of the correlation coefficient.
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21. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we first derive and analyse the optimal investment strategy for a defined contribution
pension scheme whose fund is invested in n assets, and then consider the special case of 2 assets
and study the optimal investment strategy behaviour and the downside risk (in terms of the net
replacement ratio achieved at retirement) faced by the member of the scheme, thereby extending the
model introduced in Vigna and Haberman (2001).
The extensions introduced are threefold:
1. we consider n assets instead of 2;
2. we now consider assets which are correlated with each other;
3. we generalise the disutility function in such a way that deviations of the fund above the target
are not penalised to the same degree as deviations below and the risk profile of the individual is
taken into consideration
For the case of the n=2, the downside risk has been studied by examining three risk measures: the
probability of failing the target, the mean shortfall and the Value at Risk measure (VaR) at three
different confidence levels (1%, 5% and 10%).
The annuity risk faced by the member has been analysed through these risk measures by comparing
the results relative to the net replacement ratio both in the case of a fixed conversion factor and in
the case of a random conversion factor, which depends on the prevailing yield on the low risk asset.
2. THE MODEL
We consider a defined contribution pension scheme with n-asset portfolio. The forces of interest
corresponding to the investment returns of the n assets are assumed to be normally distributed and
correlated at any time with a given variance-covariance matrix.
Contributions are paid in advance every year as a fixed proportion of the salary of the scheme’s
member. Taxation, expenses and decrements other than retirement are not taken into consideration.
The scheme member is assumed to join the scheme at time t = 0 and contribute until retirement at
time t = N, which is a time point that is fixed in advance.
The model is presented in discrete time and we assume that the portfolio is reallocated every year
between the n assets, depending on the past history of the market returns and on the current size of
the fund, which is compared to an a priori target. We then find the optimal investment allocation
every year that minimises the deviations of the fund from these corresponding targets. We assume
that there are no real salary increases and that for simplicity the salary is 1 each year.
The fund at time t+1 is given by the following equation:
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where:
ft: fund level at time t
c: contribution rate
3i
ty : proportion of the portfolio invested in the i
th
 asset during year [t, t+1], i = 1,2,…,n-1, so that the
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 asset is ∑−
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tX : force of interest of i
th
 asset in year [t, t+1], assumed to be constant over year [t, t+1], i=1,2…n
For fixed i, the sequences { itX }t=0,1,…N-1 are assumed to be IID with a normal distribution, while the
correlation structure for the annual forces of interest itX  and 
j
tX  is given by the variance-covariance
matrix, which is assumed to be constant for any t.
Therefore:
i
tX ≈ N (µi, σi2) for t = 0, 1,…, N-1
where we assume, without loss of generality, that:
µ1 > µ2 > …> µn  and σ12 > σ22 > …> σn2.
3. THE PROBLEM
3.1 FORMULATION OF THE PROBLEM
We define the “cost” incurred by the fund at time t as follows:
(3.1) Ct = )fF()fF( tt
2
tt −α+− t = 0, 1,…,N-1
(3.2) CN = θ )]fF()fF[( NN2NN −α+− t = N
with α ≥ 0 and θ ≥ 1, where Ft is the annual target for the fund at time t. The targets are assumed to
be given a priori (for example, by the investment manager or trustees of the pension scheme) and,
on grounds of simplicity, are assumed to be deterministic. In the specific case with 2 assets, which
we will deal with in a later section, we will give a particular specification of the targets.
The use of target values in the cost function is supported by the analysis of Kahneman and Tversky
(1979). The target-based approach in decision making under uncertainty is investigated and
supported also by Bordley and Li Calzi (2000), although they present a more general model in
which the targets are stochastic and the utility function is the probability of matching the target. The
use of stochastic targets could describe the real situation faced by the investment manager of a
pension fund, who would be likely to change the targets every year in response to actual experience,
but this would increase considerably the complexity of the mathematical model underlying the
problem. We have chosen deterministic targets so that the model is mathematically tractable.
It may be argued that the inclusion of yearly targets between joining the scheme and retirement is
not practical, since it may not be possible for the scheme member to change the annual contribution
to the fund by either withdrawing money from the fund or paying additional money to the fund. A
similar argument regarding decrements other than retirement, which are excluded from our model,
could be advanced. In this case, the cost function should be defined only at retirement, and the
actual fund compared with the final target only. We think that this different formulation of the
problem is interesting and we will consider it in further research. The choice of having a target
every year is adopted for reasons of mathematical tractability of the model as well as reasons of
4cautiousness (since in practice it would probably be easier to meet a final target if the path of the
fund’s growth were monitored at periodic intervals)
1
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The cost defined by (3.1) and (3.2) is positive when the fund is below the target and above a certain
level, which is equal to the target plus α, and negative between the target and this level. Intuitively,
this means that the deviations below the target are penalised, while the deviations above the target
are rewarded, until a certain level (linked to the target), after which they are penalised again. The
economic interpretation of this choice is that the possibility of gaining from high market returns is
incentivised, but, when the fund becomes too large in relation to the target, the trade-off between
risk and return means that the portfolio is cautiously invested.
Indeed, equation (3.1) can be rewritten as
(3.3) 22ttt
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so that it is clear that the “real” target being pursued by the model is α+
2
1
Ft . With this
formulation, the tf  values are pulled back towards the “real” targets so that the generation of very
high values of tf  is penalized.
By varying the parameter α we are actually considering different disutility functions with different
risk aversion factors, so that we are considering individuals with different risk profiles. In fact, it
can be shown (see Pratt 1964, Owadally 1998) that an individual’s risk aversion can be measured
either by 
)x('u
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individual’s disutility (or loss) function, where the relationship between utility and disutility
functions is: u(x)= −al(z)+b (a>0) and the relationship between loss and gain is: x+z=constant.
The disutility function considered here is l(z) = z
2
 + αz (with the loss being z = Ft−ft), and therefore
the resulting risk aversion is:
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We observe not only that the risk aversion depends on the value of α, but also that it is decreasing
when α is increasing, which means that lower values of α represent more risk averse individuals
and vice versa.
We also observe that, in our model if α → 0, i.e. for very risk averse individuals, the target pursued
tends to Ft. Instead, if α → ∞, i.e. for risk neutral individuals (A(z) = 0 means a null risk aversion,
which is equivalent to risk neutrality), the target pursued tends to infinity, which means that the
individual wants to make as much money as possible and always gain from higher than usual rates
of return. Thus, Ft and infinity are the lower and upper bounds for our real targets, when we
consider the dependence between them and the risk aversion.
The cost at time N has a weight θ which can be greater than 1. When θ is greater than 1 more
importance is given to the final target than to the yearly ones, and the rationale for this choice is that
                                                       
1 It should be noticed, however, that the different weight given to Ft and FN (1 and θ≥1) reflects the greater importance
of the final target in comparison with the yearly ones.
5decrements other than retirement are not considered in our model, and therefore the achievement of
the final target - at retirement – can be considered more important than the achievement of the
annual ones – before retirement.
The total future cost at time t is obtained by discounting the future costs until N, using a subjective
inter-temporal discount factor β as in Bellman and Kalaba (1965):
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We define ℑt the σ−field generated by all information available at time t:
(3.6) ℑt = σ(f0, f1, ..., ft, {y0i}i=1…n-1, {y1i}i,... {yt-1i}i) t = 0,1,…,N
with ℑ0 = σ(f0), f0 being the size of the fund when the member joins the scheme, that can be either 0
or greater than 0, if there is a transfer value.
The value function at time t is defined as:
(3.7) J(ℑt) = ]|G[Emin ttt ℑpi t=0, 1,..., N-1
where piτ is the set of the future investment allocations, i.e.:
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We now find the future portfolio allocations that minimise the discounted future cost incurred by
the fund.
3.2 BELLMAN’S OPTIMALITY PRINCIPLE
By applying Bellman’s optimality principle we find:
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Since the sequences { itX }t=0,…,N-1 are assumed to be independent for any t, {ft} is a Markov chain
and:
Pr[ft+1 | ℑt] = Pr[ft+1 | ft], and also: Pr[ft+1, ft+2,..., fN | ℑt] = Pr[ft+1, ft+2,..., fN | ft]
so that:
Pr[Gt | ℑt] = Pr[Gt | ft]
and:
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The dynamic programming problem, which we have defined, now becomes:
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(3.11) J(fN, N) = CN = θ )]fF()fF[( NN2NN −α+−
with {Ft}t=1,…,N given.
3.3 SOLUTION OF THE DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING PROBLEM
It can be proved by mathematical induction that (a sketch of the proof is in the appendix):
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where the sequences {Pt} and {Qt} and {Rt} are given by the recursive relationship:
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7with (when possible, we suppress the time index t, noting that the distributions of the asset returns
do not change over time, in order to simplify the notation):
Wi = i
X
e
aij = E[(Wi – Wn) (Wj – Wn)]
bi = E[(Wi – Wn)]
di = E[(Wi – Wn)]-E[(Wn
2
)]
A := (aij) matrix
Bi = determinant of the matrix obtained by A, replacing the i
th
 column with the vector b=(bi)i=1,…,n-1
Di = determinant of the matrix obtained by A, replacing the i
th
 column with the vector d=(di)i=1,…,n-1
)s(g
nX
: moment generating function of Xn (therefore, )s(g
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In addition, we find that the optimal investment strategy is given by the following optimal
investment allocation at time t:
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and the other notation as before.
3.4 THE TWO-ASSET CASE
We have analysed the particular case of n = 2, considering the case of a pension fund invested in a
high-risk and a low-risk asset.
The fund at time t+1 is given by the following equation:
(3.17) ]e)y1(ey)[cf(f tt ttt1t
µλ
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where:
ft: fund level at time t
c: contribution rate
yt: proportion of fund invested in the high-risk asset during year [t, t+1]
8λt: real force of interest for the high-risk asset in year [t, t+1], assumed to be constant over the year
[t, t+1]
µt: real force of interest for the low-risk asset in year [t, t+1], assumed to be constant over the year
[t, t+1]
The sequences {µt} and {λt} are assumed to be IID with normal distribution, while the annual
forces of interest µt and λt are correlated with correlation factor ρ, assumed to be constant for any t.
Therefore:
λt ≈ N(λ, σ12) and  µt ≈ N(µ, σ22) for t = 0, 1,…,N-1
where:
λ > µ and  σ12 > σ22
It follows that:
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The optimal investment strategy in the 2-asset case is given by:
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3.5 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN α AND THE OPTIMAL INVESTMENT STRATEGY
Looking at formula (3.22) above, we observe that α affects the sequence {Qt} only (observing that
the coefficients Rt do not appear in the formula of yt
*
), which increases in value as α increases,
leading to higher values of yt
*
, everything else being equal. Thus, we conclude that yt
*
 increases as
α increases.
This is a reasonable result as we observe that α measures the risk aversion of the individual: a
higher value of α corresponds to a lower risk aversion and leads to a higher fraction of the portfolio
being invested in the riskier asset. This result is consistent also with intuition: by increasing α we
are increasing both the penalisation of deviations below the target and the reward of deviations
above, pushing the optimal portfolio to be invested more in riskier assets.
In particular, considering the behaviour of the risk neutral investor (α → ∞), we see that, in our
model, the risk neutral individual would short sell as much as possible low-risk assets in order to
buy as much as possible high-risk assets. If short selling were not allowed (a hypothesis that we will
make next in the simulation), the risk neutral investor would invest the whole fund in the high risk
asset and never switch into the low risk asset
2
. This asset allocation is supported by Blake et al
(2001), who argue that there is no evidence for the appropriateness of switching the fund into lower
risk assets prior to retirement for the risk neutral individual, except for prudential reasons. However,
in their analysis they do not consider individuals with different levels of risk aversion.
The meaning of α will be considered again later, when we discuss the simulation results.
                                                       
2 In this case the optimal investment strategy would be: y*t =1 at any time 0≤t≤N-1.
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4. THE SIMULATIONS
4.1 SIMULATIONS FRAMEWORK
We have investigated the solution presented in section 3.4 (2-asset case) for many scenarios, and
have studied the sensitivity of the results to changes in the values of Ft, α and ρ by carrying out
simulations.
We have also considered different generations of members by changing the value of N: 10, 20, 30
and 40 years to retirement. We assume that the member joins the scheme without a transfer value,
which means that f0 = 0. The contribution rate has been taken equal to 12%, the weight θ given to
the final target has been chosen equal to 2 and the subjective inter-temporal discount factor β has
been taken equal to 0.95.
The parameters of the asset returns chosen are:
λ = 10% µ = 4%    σ1 = 15% σ2 = 5%.
The correlation factor ρ takes the values -1, -1/2, 0, 1/2, 1; α takes many values, depending on the
time to retirement.
The choice of different values of α for different durations is not arbitrary and is due to the fact that,
since short selling is not allowed in our simulations (see later in this paragraph), the value of yt
*
stabilises at 1 after a certain value of α (we recall that yt
* 
increases as α increases), which depends
on the time to retirement (see section 6.3). Thus, for N = 10, α takes the following values: 0, 0.25,
0.5, 0.75, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6; for N = 20, α takes the following values: 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 15, 20,
30; for N = 30, α takes the following values: 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7.5, 10, 12.5, 15, 20, 25, 30, 40, 50, 60;
for N = 40, α takes the following values: 0, 1, 2.5, 5, 7.5, 10, 12.5, 15, 17.5, 20, 22.5, 25, 30, 35, 40,
50, 75, 100, 150, 200.
For each scenario, 1000 simulations have been carried out by generating, for each simulation, the
asset returns for N years (with N = 10, 20, 30, 40), and deriving, for each year, the optimal portfolio
allocation derived by the model. In all the scenarios investigated, we use the same 1000 paths of
returns and just change the other parameters like Ft, α and ρ. The rationale is that we wish to study
the effect of changing the parameters and we do not wish the results to be affected (and
confounded) by differences in the simulated paths of returns.
As mentioned above, in our simulations we have imposed the constraint that short selling is not
allowed; therefore we have constrained the true value of yt
*
 and set it equal to 0 when we had a
negative value, and set it equal to 1 when we had a value greater than 1. We have then used the
truncated value as the adopted investment strategy in the growth of the fund. We are aware of the
fact that the simulations do not correspond exactly to the underlying model, due to this additional
constraint, and the investment strategies adopted could be called “sub-optimal”. The rationale for
this choice is on the one hand to give results which can be easily compared with each other, the
range being [0, 1] in all cases; on the other hand, to have a mathematical model which is tractable:
adding the constraint 0 ≤ yt* ≤ 1 would complicate further the model; however, we think that this
could be a useful improvement of the model and defer this to further research.
At the time of retirement, N, we have followed Vigna and Haberman (2001) and analysed the
behaviour of the optimal investment strategy and studied how it changes if we change the targets,
the disutility function, and the correlation factor ρ. Furthermore, we have calculated the fund
accumulated, and also the net replacement ratio achieved by the member using two different
methods, in order to measure the effect of the annuity risk on the retiree income. For the first
11
method, we have converted the accumulated fund into an annuity using an actuarial value, ax, based
on discounting at the expected return of the low risk asset (i.e. a fixed rate
3
). For the second method,
we have used a variable annuity value, xa
~ , with discounting based on the average of the realised
returns by the low risk asset in the last 5 years before retirement (setting a minimum of 2% in order
to avoid unreasonable values in the case of a very poor performance of the low risk asset prior to
retirement) and the variance of the low risk asset experienced during the N years of membership
4
.
In both cases, the annuity values depend on the returns on the low risk asset in order to represent the
pricing behaviour of an insurance company, which would utilise the returns on matching fixed
interest bonds in its calculations. For both methods, the mortality table used to calculate the
actuarial value is the Italian projected mortality table (RGS48) and the retirement age has been
chosen throughout to be x = 62.
Considering that the salary is 1 at any time, the net replacement ratio achieved using the first
method of calculation is:
x
N
N
a
f
b = ,
whereas  the net replacement ratio achieved using the second method of calculation is:
x
N
N
a~
f
b
~
= .
The net replacement ratio achieved using the first method, bN, takes into account only the
investment risk faced by the member
5
, as the conversion rate used is fixed. The net replacement
ratio achieved using the second method, Nb
~
 (“bNt” or “bNtilde” in the Figures that follow), takes
into account also the annuity risk faced by the member
6
, as the conversion rate is linked to the
simulated returns on the low risk asset in the years before retirement, and therefore it is variable,
reflecting the simulated behaviour of the low risk asset.
We illustrate only the results for the 30 years’ case (we note that the other durations, N=10, 20, 40,
give similar results). Similarly, we illustrate only the results for the VaR at 5% confidence level (we
note that the VaR measures at 1% and 10% confidence levels give similar results).
4.2 TARGETS
Since the fund and contributions are invested in a 2-asset portfolio, we have chosen the yearly
targets as the accumulated fund using a particular average of the rates of return of the 2 assets. We
have considered three different cases: (a) the rate of return equal to µ, as though the fund were fully
                                                       
3 The discount factor used to calculate the annuity value ax is v=
2
2t 5.0e]e[E
σ+µ−µ−
= , with µ = 4% and σ2 = 5%.
4 The discount factor used to calculate the annuity value xa
~  is 
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5 By “investment risk” we mean the risk that the returns experienced during the membership have been too low leading
to a low final fund. This risk is borne during the accumulation period.
6 By “annuity risk” we mean the risk that the rate used in the conversion of the capital into annuity is too low, leading to
a low pension rate (the actual conversion rate used to calculate the annuity is directly linked to the current market
yields, and so the perceived pension will strongly depend on the level of the markets rates at retirement). This risk is
borne at retirement, when the annuity is purchased.
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invested in the low risk asset; (b) the rate of return equal to the Chisini average of µt and λt relative
to the expected return over one year of a portfolio invested equally in the 2 assets, as though the
fund were invested half in the low risk and half in the high risk asset; (c) the rate of return equal to
λ, as though the fund were fully invested in the high risk asset.
Therefore, the yearly target at time t is:
(4.1)
jt
tj
0t scefF &&+= t=1,…,N
with i such that:
(a) j = µ; (b) j = r*; (c) j = λ,
with
7
 
(4.2) r* = )2(
8
1
)(
2
1 2
221
2
1 σ+σρσ+σ+λ+µ
Therefore, the value of j for determining the target values takes the three different values: 4%, r* as
defined by (4.2) above (we observe that this value depends on the value of ρ, so it varies with the
different values of the correlation factor) and 10%.
We set F0 = f0 , where f0 is the fund held by the member when he/she joins the scheme (i.e. the
transfer value, which in our model is zero).
4.3 MEASURES OF RISK
The downside risk faced by the member of the pension scheme is analysed by comparing the net
replacement ratios achieved, bN and Nb
~
, with the target ratio BN, which is defined to be the fund
target FN divided by an actuarial annuity value ax. In other words:
x
N
N
a
F
B = .
The idea of comparing the net replacement ratio achieved with the target pursued is consistent with
the analysis of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), who observe that individuals perceive the outcomes
as gains and losses relative to some neutral “reference point” (which, in our case, is the target).
The risk has been measured in the three different ways:
a) Probability of failing the target.
This is defined as the proportion of outcomes where bN (or Nb
~
) is less than the target BN. Thus
1000
k
)BbPr( NN =< , where k represents the number of failures out of 1000 simulations. We note
that the amount by which bN (or Nb
~
) falls below BN is not taken into account by this risk measure.
                                                       
7
 We found r* by solving ]e[E]e[E 2*r
tt λ+µ
= , following the definition given above.
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In the same way we define )Bb
~
Pr( NN < .
b) Mean shortfall.
The mean shortfall is the conditional mean of shortfall below the target, conditional on (bN − BN)<0
(or ( Nb
~
 − BN) < 0). Thus, using the upper suffix j to refer to a simulation, we have:
mean shortfall (bN) = ∑
=
−
k
1j
N
j
N )Bb(
k
1
 where )Bb( N
j
N −  < 0 for j = 1, 2, …,k.
In the same way we define the mean shortfall ( Nb
~
).
As demonstrated by Artzner et al (1999) and Artzner (2000), risk measures based on the mean
shortfall have more desirable properties than the commonly used Value-at-Risk (VaR) measures. In
particular, these are coherent risk measures (as introduced by Artzner et al (1998)), whereas a VaR
measure is not, as it fails to satisfy the sub-additive property (as many examples can show), which
is required of any coherent risk measure. As a result, mean shortfall risk measures have become
widely used in the recent actuarial literature: for example, see Albrecht et al (2001) for a discussion
of equity risk and Hardy (2001) for an application to segregated funds.
c) Value at Risk (VaR).
The VaR measure at confidence level ε is defined to be the 100εth lowest percentile of the
simulated distribution of bN (or Nb
~
).
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5. RESULTS: THE OPTIMAL INVESTMENT STRATEGY
5.1 OPTIMAL INVESTMENT STRATEGY
We observe, as in Vigna and Haberman (2001), that the optimal investment allocation yt
*
 decreases
on average with the time, which indicates the suitability of the lifestyle policy
8
 for defined
contribution pension schemes. This is illustrated by the results in Figures 1-3 (and by other detailed
results not shown here but available on request from the authors).
The only exception to the suitability of the lifestyle strategy is when the individual is risk neutral, as
mentioned above. In this case, the scheme member will invest the whole fund in the high risk asset
at any time between joining the scheme and retirement.
5.2 EFFECT OF CHANGING THE TARGETS
We have studied the behaviour of the optimal investment strategy when the targets change. The
three graphs of Figure 1 report some percentiles (5
th
, 25
th
, 50
th
, 75
th
 and 95
th
), the minimum and
maximum of the distribution of yt
*
 in the cases of µ-based targets, r*-based targets and λ-based
targets, when α=1.
We observe that moving from µ-based targets to λ–based targets, the optimal proportion of the
portfolio to be invested in the high risk asset increases. This is evident if we look at formula (3.22)
for yt
*
: it can be easily seen that the value of yt
*
 increases as the target Ft increases, everything else
being equal. This is also an intuitive result, since one must increase the aggressiveness of the
strategy if the target to be attained increases.
                                                       
8 We recall that by “lifestyle strategy” we mean the investment strategy largely adopted in defined contribution pension
schemes in UK, which consists in investing at the beginning the whole fund in equities, switching it into bonds and cash
as retirement approaches (usually 3-5 years before retirement).
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FIGURE 1: CHANGING THE TARGETS (THE VALUE OF j)
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5.3 EFFECT OF CHANGING THE DISUTILITY FUNCTION
We have studied the effect of changing the disutility function by observing the behaviour of yt
*
when we change the value of α and leave unchanged the value of ρ.
In all cases (i.e. for any N and any ρ) we have found that yt* increases on average as α increases.
This is consistent with the fact that, the higher is α, the lower is the risk aversion of the individual,
hence the riskier the investment strategy adopted.
The graphs reported in Figure 2 show how the level of the optimal investment strategy increases
with α in the 2 cases ρ  = -½ (on the left) and ρ = ½ (on the right) with the r*-based targets. The
graphs report the mean of yt
*
 (for t = 0, 1,…, 29) over the 1000 simulations that have been carried
out.
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5.4 EFFECT OF CHANGING THE CORRELATION BETWEEN THE ASSET RETURNS
We have studied the effect of changing the correlation factor ρ on the optimal investment strategy
by comparing the behaviour of yt
*
 when N and α are fixed and ρ changes.
We have discovered two interesting trends:
1 – in the early years of membership, the optimal allocation yt
*
 increases as ρ increases from
negative to positive values, while in the last years of membership, towards retirement, it decreases
as ρ increases;
2 –apart from the early years of membership, the standard deviation of yt
*
 increases as ρ increases.
The graphs in Figure 3 show the optimal investment strategy for the different values of ρ (-1, -½, 0,
½, 1) when α = 0 (on the left) and when α = 10 (on the right).  The graphs report certain percentiles
(5
th
, 25
th
, 50
th
, 75
th
 and 95
th
), the minimum and the maximum of the distribution of yt
*
 over the 1000
simulations carried out. We can see that, when ρ increases from –1 to +1, the curves reporting the
percentiles become steeper in their descent from 1 to 0, confirming the first trend above explained
(higher values of yt
*
 at the beginning and lower at the end when ρ increases).
An economic explanation of this feature is as follows. We observe that a strategy is well diversified
if the curve yt
* 
decreases gradually towards zero, less diversified if the curve decreases steeply
towards zero. When ρ is low, in the range (-1, -½), there is negative correlation between the asset
returns and it is convenient to diversify the portfolio between the assets and, therefore, the optimal
investment allocation leads to a fraction to be invested in the riskier asset which decreases very
gradually towards zero. When ρ is high, in the range (½, 1), there is positive correlation between the
asset returns and the diversification effect is not so rewarding, so the portfolio can be invested more
heavily either in the riskier or in the less risky asset, leading the optimal investment allocation to
decrease steeply towards zero.
The graphs in Figure 4 show how the standard deviation of yt
*
 changes in value when ρ increases.
When α = 0, the standard deviation increases as ρ increases. This feature is also observed in Figure
3: with negative values of ρ, the percentiles tend to stabilise around a certain percentage (30-40%),
while with positive values of ρ the percentiles are more spread between 0 and 1.
An economic explanation of this feature is the following. When ρ increases from –1 to +1, the
benefits of diversification decrease, pushing yt
*
 upwards. On the other hand, with high positive
values of ρ, the investor needs more hedging in order to achieve the target at time N and this factor
pushes yt
*
 downwards. The value of the optimal investment allocation will be high or low
depending on which of these two effects is dominating (and this depends only on the returns
experienced in the past), leading the values to be more spread and the standard deviation to be
higher. For higher values of α , for example α =10, the optimal asset allocation yt
*
 increases and the
balance between these two effects is different.
This phenomenon seems to indicate that, with negative correlation between the asset returns, the
investment strategy is more stable on average than for the case of positive correlation, where it
remains on almost the same level regardless of the past experience of asset returns. This feature
may be interesting from the pension scheme investment manager’s point of view in two respects:
firstly, when he/she considers projections and plans regarding the investment strategy to be adopted
over a long period in the future, and, secondly, considering the fact that, in the real world, portfolios
tend to be invested in assets with returns that are negatively correlated.
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The detailed results for yt
*
 indicate that they are relatively insensitive to small changes in ρ . This
corresponds to the results of Chopra and Ziemba (1993), who find that optimal asset allocation
results are much more sensitive to errors in means than to errors in variances and much more
sensitive to errors in variances than to errors in covariances. This finding is particularly apparent as
the risk aversion of the investor reduces – this corresponds here to increases in the value of α .
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FIGURE 3: CHANGING CORRELATION BETWEEN ASSETS (VALUE OF ρ)
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FIGURE 4: STANDARD DEVIATION OF Yt
*
 WHEN ρ CHANGES
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6. RESULTS: THE DOWNSIDE RISK
6.1 THE MEANING OF α
Before consideration of the results, it is worth recalling that α can be given two meanings in our
model. On the one hand, as we have already seen, it is a measure of the risk profile of the individual
with the disutility function Ct: the higher is its value, the less risk averse is the individual. On the
other hand, it is a measure of the aggressiveness of the optimal investment strategy. In fact, if we
look at the formula that determines y*t above, (3.22), we can easily observe that it depends directly
on α, so that we have an increasing y*t with α increasing. Therefore, a low value of α indicates a
cautious investment strategy, while a higher value of α indicates a riskier investment strategy. It is
clear that these two viewpoints are consistent with each other.
6.2 THE DIFFERENT RISK MEASURES
In Figure 5, we have plotted the three different risk measures considered against the different values
of α in the case of 30 years, r*-targets and ρ = 0.
We observe the following results:
a) the probability of failing the target decreases as α increases;
b) the mean shortfall increases slightly as α increases;
c) the VaR at 5% level is relatively stable as α increases.
The explanation for a) and b) is the following. Lower values of α lead to more cautious strategies,
which lead to a greater number of failures but to more limited “losses” when a failure occurs. In
contrast, higher values of α lead to riskier strategies and to a higher mean and a higher standard
deviation of the distribution of both bN and Nb
~
, and this leads to a smaller number of failures (due
to a higher mean) but slightly greater deviations from target when a failure occurs. This arises
because the higher mean and standard deviation lead to a much longer right tail of the distribution
of the net replacement ratio and to a slightly longer left tail of the distribution, with the lowest
percentiles being smaller, so that a slightly greater mean shortfall results (as α increases).
The explanation for c) is the following: the VaR at 5% level remains stable because of the
combined and opposing effects of the higher mean and standard deviation of the distribution of bN
and Nb
~
, as α increases, and the net effect is to lead to the lower percentiles remaining fairly stable.
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FIGURE 5: RISK MEASURES AGAINST α
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6.3 THE DIFFERENT TARGETS AND THE RISK MEASURES
In Figures 6, 7 and 8, we show the results for b30t and b30 as α varies, for the three different risk
measures with each of the different targets chosen, and for the case of ρ=0. We consider the effect
of changes in ρ  in a later section.
A general result that comes out of the graphs is that, by increasing the targets (ie moving down the
page from µ-based targets to λ-based targets), the levels of all of the risk measures increase. This is
an intuitive result, as it is more difficult to reach higher targets than lower ones. Furthermore, as we
move down the page, the optimal investment strategy becomes riskier, since y*t increases as the
target values of Ft increase (see section 5.2).
Another general result is that, for very high values of α, in all of the graphs, the risk measures tend
to stabilise themselves, leading to the curves becoming approximately horizontal. As mentioned
before, this is a feature of the model: since short selling is not allowed and since increasing the
value of α will increase the riskiness of the strategy, after a certain value of α the value of y*t will
be always 1. This leads to the same strategy regardless of the rates of return that have been
simulated (in which all the fund is invested in the high risk asset at any time), and hence to very
small differences in the results, and therefore to the flat curves displayed in Figures 6-8 for the risk
measures at extreme values of α.
We also find (in results not shown here) that the value of α after which y*t reaches 1 increases with
the time to retirement N, and this suggests that the choice of α for different durations should be
different. This also reflects the intuitive fact that, with a short time to retirement, an individual is
more risk averse so that α takes low values, while, with a long time to retirement, an individual is
less risk averse so that α takes high values.
We now analyse the different figures separately.
Probability of failing the target.
The three graphs of Figure 6 report the probability of failing the target with the three different
targets. We observe the following points:
1 – when we consider the initial values of the probability of failing the target in the two cases of b30
and b30t, when α=0, we see that this probability is higher for b30t than for b30 in the case of µ-based
targets (with an approximate 10% gap), whereas it is lower for b30t than for b30 in the case of the r*-
based (with an approximate 10% gap) and λ-based targets (with an approximate 20% gap). The fact
that the probability of failing the target is higher for b30t than for b30 may not be a surprise, as it
arises from the fact that the magnitude of b30 is affected by the investment risk only, whereas the
magnitude of b30t is affected by both the investment and annuity risk. What may seem strange is the
fact that the probability of failing the target is lower for b30t than for b30 with the r*- and λ-based
targets. A possible explanation for this is given by looking at the aggressiveness of the strategy in
the considered cases. In the case of the µ-based targets, the α=0 strategies are very cautious, so the
fund is likely to be invested more in the low risk asset during membership and entirely in the low
risk asset just before retirement (because of the lifestyle profile shown by the optimal values of y*t),
so that the reason for failing the target is likely to be mainly due to poor performance of the low risk
asset, either during the period of membership and/or just before retirement. On the other hand, in
the case of the r*- and λ-based targets, the strategies are riskier and the reason for failure may
depend also on the adverse performance of the high risk asset. When this happens, there are cases in
which the poor performance of the high risk asset leads to a failure regarding the achievement of
b30, but not to a failure regarding the achievement of b30t due to the good performance of the low
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risk asset prior to retirement (leading to a more favourable annuity conversion rate than the one
used in the b30 case). The gap between the probabilities values becomes larger when moving from
the r*- to λ-based targets as the strategies become riskier and the weight attaching to the adverse
performance of the high risk asset increases;
2 – the descent of the probability curve is steeper for the b30 case than for the b30t one. This is
probably to be explained by referring to the annuity risk and the aggressiveness of the strategies.
Moving from the left to the right in each of the graphs, the value of α increases and the strategy
becomes more aggressive. The increased aggressiveness of the strategy affects the general level of
the final fund fN which increases, but does not affect the values of the simulated µt in the final years
before retirement, which are used (by the insurance company) to price the annuity in the case of
b30t. We observe that, in the case of b30 , failures are only due to the low value of fN in relation to
the target FN, whereas in the case of b30t, failures are due also to the low value of the simulated µt in
the final years before retirement. Therefore, acting on the general level of the final fund fN will have
a greater effect on the probability of failing the target in the b30 case, because we are reducing the
impact of the only cause of failures in the b30 case (but only one of the 2 causes in the b30t case),
and this leads to a steeper decrease in the probability curve.
These two features explain the shape of the curves in Figure 6 and the fact that in the last 2 graphs
(r*- and λ-based targets) the b30 and the b30t curves exhibit a cross-over.
Mean shortfall.
The three graphs of Figure 7 report the mean shortfall with the three different targets. We observe
the following points:
1 – when we consider the initial values of the mean shortfall, when α=0, in the two cases of b30 and
b30t we see that this is always higher for b30t than for b30. A failure in the case of b30 occurs when f30
< F30, and the size of the failure is proportional to the difference f30 − F30. But, in the case of b30t,
the size of the failure is also determined by the behaviour of the low-risk asset prior to retirement,
with a poor performance leading to a bigger deviation in the case of b30t than in the case of b30. We
see that, in most cases of failure for both b30 and b30t, the low risk asset has a return lower than 4%
in the last 5 years before retirement (also noting that failure depends heavily on the return of the low
risk asset, due to the lifestyle strategy adopted and cautiousness of the strategy), and this leads to
bigger deviations for b30t and therefore a bigger mean shortfall;
2 – as before, the mean shortfall curve increases more smoothly for b30t than for b30 (Note that, in
some places, the curve appears to be decreasing, but this is a small effect and may be due to the
relatively small number of cases considered – recalling that the mean shortfall does not consider the
deviations from the target of the 1000 simulations, but only the simulations in which the target is
missed). This difference in smoothness can be explained in the following way. When we move from
the left to the right of the graph, the strategy becomes more aggressive and this leads to results that
are more spread out in terms of final fund achieved, affecting directly the net replacement achieved
in the b30 case. In the b30t case, this effect is not so direct, as the final fund has still to be
transformed into a net replacement ratio by applying the variable conversion rate; therefore, it may
happen that, in some of the cases of failure, the effect of a very low final fund may be reduced by a
lower than usual conversion rate (i.e. a lower xa
~ ). Again, increasing the aggressiveness of the
strategy will affect only the final fund achieved, not the distribution of the simulated rates of return
of the low risk asset, and this has a more adverse effect on the b30 case than the b30t case.
These 2 features explain the shape of the curves and the fact that, in all of the figures, the b30 and
the b30t curves cross over.
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VaR at 5% confidence.
The three graphs of Figure 8 report the VaR at 5% confidence with the three different targets. We
observe the following points:
1 – the VaR curves are fairly stable when α changes and they slightly increase with low – medium
values of α in the case of µ-based targets;
2 – the VaR curve lies always at a higher level for the b30 case than for the b30t one and the two
curves do not cross over. This underlines the annuity risk that the member has to face, as the VaR at
5% confidence is the 5
th
 percentile of the distribution of the net replacement ratio and the fact that
the VaR of the b30t is lower than the VaR of the b30 indicates that the poor outcomes are more
adverse in the case of a variable annuity rate;
3 – for high values of α the VaR curves stay in the same range (60% - 65%), regardless of the target
chosen.
The relative stability of the VaR values shown in Figure 8 is explained by the effect of increasing α
on the underlying simulated distributions of b30 and b30t. These are not shown here but examination
of these distributions and the associated sample moments and quantiles shows that, as α increases,
the means, medians and standard deviations all increase, as do the higher quantiles eg the 75
th
.
However, the lower quantiles are relatively stable (and these, of course, directly affect the VaR
estimates), representing the net effect of 2 conflicting influences – distributions with increasing
means and increasing spreads about the means.
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FIGURE 6: PROBABILITY OF FAILING THE TARGET
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FIGURE 7: MEAN SHORTFALL
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FIGURE 8: VaR AT 5% CONFIDENCE
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6.4 EFFECT OF CHANGING CORRELATION BETWEEN THE ASSET RETURNS
Up to now (in Figures 5-8) the downside risk borne by the member has been analysed in the case of
uncorrelated assets, i.e. ρ=0. Tables 1, 2 and 3 and Figures 9 and 10 report the different results
relative to the three risk measures when we let the correlation factor vary from ρ = −1 to ρ = 1 (for a
term of 30 years and r*-based targets).
We observe that, when ρ changes, there are very small changes in the behaviour of the three risk
measures. This phenomenon is to be explained by considering the behaviour of the optimal
investment strategies: the optimal investment strategy changes very little when the correlation factor
ρ varies, and this is due to the small influence of the coefficient ρ on yt* (consider formula (3.22)
above), compared to the much larger influence of other factors like α and the targets Ft. As noted
earlier, a similar result has been found by Chopra and Ziemba (1993) in respect of covariances.
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TABLE 1: PROBABILITY OF FAILING THE TARGET WHEN ρ CHANGES
TABLE 2: MEAN SHORTFALL WHEN ρ CHANGES
TABLE 3: VaR AT 5% CONFIDENCE WHEN ρ CHANGES
b30 b30t b30 b30t b30 b30t b30 b30t b30 b30t
α=0 60.00% 57.90% 65.80% 59.30% 71.20% 60.00% 75.50% 61.40% 73.30% 62.00%
α=1 44.00% 51.60% 47.90% 53.10% 52.20% 54.30% 57.40% 54.90% 57.50% 54.60%
α=2 31.60% 47.30% 34.00% 48.10% 36.90% 48.80% 39.00% 50.20% 40.00% 49.30%
α=3 22.90% 41.80% 23.30% 43.20% 24.40% 45.00% 25.10% 45.00% 23.90% 43.90%
α=4 17.60% 37.00% 18.10% 38.60% 18.00% 40.00% 17.90% 40.90% 16.40% 40.90%
α=5 15.00% 33.10% 14.90% 34.30% 14.10% 36.10% 14.20% 36.90% 13.60% 36.40%
α=7.5 10.80% 23.20% 11.00% 24.90% 11.30% 26.70% 11.70% 28.90% 11.90% 28.80%
α=10 10.70% 17.50% 11.10% 18.70% 11.20% 19.50% 11.80% 20.10% 12.70% 20.70%
α=12.5 11.30% 14.00% 11.90% 14.70% 12.30% 15.00% 12.60% 15.10% 13.40% 15.40%
α=15 12.30% 13.50% 12.60% 13.40% 12.90% 13.10% 13.20% 13.90% 13.50% 14.20%
α=20 13.00% 13.30% 13.00% 13.70% 13.40% 13.90% 13.50% 14.00% 13.60% 14.50%
α=25 13.30% 13.80% 13.30% 13.90% 13.40% 14.10% 13.50% 14.40% 13.70% 14.70%
α=30 13.30% 13.80% 13.30% 14.20% 13.50% 14.40% 13.70% 14.80% 13.80% 14.90%
α=40 13.50% 14.40% 13.50% 14.80% 13.60% 14.90% 13.80% 15.10% 13.90% 15.40%
α=50 13.60% 14.70% 13.60% 14.90% 13.70% 15.10% 13.80% 15.20% 13.90% 15.40%
α=60 13.60% 14.80% 13.60% 15.00% 13.70% 15.10% 13.80% 15.20% 13.90% 15.40%
ρ=0 ρ=1/2 ρ=1
PROBABILITY OF FAILING THE TARGET
ρ=−1 ρ=−1/2
b30 b30t b30 b30t b30 b30t b30 b30t b30 b30t
α=0 10.93% 18.20% 10.57% 18.51% 10.39% 18.97% 10.35% 19.09% 10.95% 19.28%
α=1 10.55% 16.91% 10.16% 17.18% 9.77% 17.54% 9.26% 17.87% 9.57% 18.20%
α=2 10.89% 15.38% 10.42% 15.93% 9.87% 16.45% 9.51% 16.58% 9.43% 17.08%
α=3 12.04% 14.62% 11.98% 14.98% 11.52% 15.16% 11.27% 15.74% 11.82% 16.14%
α=4 13.38% 14.10% 13.03% 14.26% 13.09% 14.52% 13.49% 14.88% 15.16% 15.08%
α=5 14.20% 13.55% 14.29% 13.80% 15.48% 13.93% 16.15% 14.37% 17.90% 15.06%
α=7.5 18.71% 14.41% 19.17% 14.00% 19.72% 13.89% 20.69% 13.79% 22.41% 14.59%
α=10 20.32% 16.52% 20.69% 16.14% 21.79% 16.26% 22.26% 16.59% 22.14% 16.78%
α=12.5 20.94% 20.09% 20.86% 19.82% 21.32% 20.13% 21.89% 20.92% 21.65% 21.05%
α=15 20.52% 21.12% 20.83% 21.99% 21.23% 23.30% 21.60% 22.58% 22.02% 23.05%
α=20 20.83% 22.36% 21.44% 22.32% 21.41% 22.63% 21.84% 23.09% 22.10% 22.75%
α=25 20.88% 22.11% 21.37% 22.45% 21.62% 22.56% 21.86% 22.51% 21.95% 22.56%
α=30 21.00% 22.27% 21.40% 22.05% 21.48% 22.16% 21.67% 22.14% 22.00% 22.49%
α=40 20.84% 21.67% 21.26% 21.51% 21.52% 21.85% 21.62% 22.07% 21.87% 22.09%
α=50 20.76% 21.48% 21.15% 21.61% 21.39% 21.73% 21.63% 21.99% 21.87% 22.09%
α=60 20.76% 21.38% 21.15% 21.49% 21.39% 21.74% 21.63% 21.99% 21.87% 22.09%
MEAN SHORTFALL
ρ=−1 ρ=−1/2 ρ=0 ρ=1/2 ρ=1
b30 b30t b30 b30t b30 b30t b30 b30t b30 b30t
α=0 61.80% 54.57% 62.40% 54.34% 62.04% 54.74% 59.81% 54.40% 58.32% 54.83%
α=1 65.65% 56.54% 65.12% 57.08% 65.67% 57.24% 66.06% 56.90% 63.32% 57.24%
α=2 67.88% 59.23% 68.21% 58.74% 68.83% 59.77% 67.87% 59.54% 66.85% 59.28%
α=3 70.15% 60.49% 70.69% 60.98% 71.14% 61.49% 71.47% 61.66% 70.79% 61.78%
α=4 71.98% 62.55% 72.85% 62.74% 72.62% 63.31% 72.69% 62.71% 71.71% 63.80%
α=5 73.63% 64.56% 73.67% 65.33% 73.15% 65.33% 71.76% 64.74% 70.52% 64.92%
α=7.5 73.76% 65.57% 71.98% 65.02% 71.03% 64.04% 68.10% 64.65% 64.71% 62.52%
α=10 70.60% 65.57% 70.49% 64.75% 69.68% 64.83% 65.22% 63.48% 64.71% 61.76%
α=12.5 69.65% 64.72% 67.05% 63.50% 65.22% 62.57% 64.71% 61.76% 63.76% 61.76%
α=15 65.22% 63.80% 65.22% 62.93% 64.71% 61.78% 63.76% 61.76% 63.60% 61.76%
α=20 63.80% 61.78% 63.76% 61.76% 63.60% 61.76% 63.60% 61.65% 63.60% 61.65%
α=25 63.60% 61.76% 63.60% 61.65% 63.60% 61.65% 63.60% 61.65% 63.60% 61.65%
α=30 63.60% 61.65% 63.60% 61.65% 63.60% 61.65% 63.60% 61.65% 63.36% 61.65%
α=40 63.60% 61.65% 63.60% 61.65% 63.36% 61.65% 63.36% 61.65% 63.36% 61.65%
α=50 63.36% 61.65% 63.36% 61.65% 63.36% 61.65% 63.36% 61.65% 63.36% 61.65%
α=60 63.36% 61.65% 63.36% 61.65% 63.36% 61.65% 63.36% 61.65% 63.36% 61.65%
VAR AT 5% CONFIDENCE
ρ=−1 ρ=−1/2 ρ=0 ρ=1/2 ρ=1
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FIGURE 9: RISK MEASURES WHEN ρ CHANGES (b30)
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FIGURE 10: RISK MEASURES WHEN ρ CHANGES (b30t)
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6.5 DISTRIBUTIONS OF b30 AND b30t WITH THE DIFFERENT TARGETS
Figures 11 and 12 report the observed distributions of b30 and b30t over the 1000 simulations, with
the different targets (for the case where α = 0 and ρ = 0)9. The final target in terms of net
replacement ratio (B30) is also indicated, in order to facilitate comparisons.
First, we notice that a simple comparison of the distributions of the net replacement ratio with
different targets is not feasible, the ranges of the distributions being different (we recall that the
targets affect considerably the optimal investment strategy, and therefore the outcomes). However,
we notice that the different targets affect the distributions of the net replacement ratio achieved in a
similar way in the cases b30 and b30t: moving down the page, from λ-based targets to µ-based
targets, we see that the mode moves towards the left tail of the distribution and, furthermore, the
right tail becomes longer, and the left tail shorter.
The comparison between b30 and b30t is even more striking. Whereas in the b30 case we notice
that the final target B30 lies next to the mode (sometimes it is located to the right of the mode, but
with a small gap between them), in the b30t case B30 is located to the right of the mode, with a
considerable gap between the two values. This underlines again the annuity risk borne by the
member of a DC scheme: when the annuity risk is added to the investment risk, there are fewer
chances for the target to be achieved.
On the other hand, we notice also that the results, as we expected from our previous discussion, are
much more spread out in the b30t case (for example, they range between 0.27 and 2.04 in the r*-
target case, against the range [0.33, 1.1] for the b30 case). This means that, in the case of higher
than expected investment returns, the variable annuity factor turns to be advantageous to the
member, leading to a higher net replacement ratio than with a fixed annuity factor.
                                                       
9 Note the different scales used for the horizontal axes in Figures 11 and 12.
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FIGURE 11: DISTRIBUTIONS OF b30
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FIGURE 12: DISTRIBUTIONS OF b30t
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7. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
In our paper we have derived a formula for the optimal investment allocation (using a dynamic
programming approach as in Vigna and Haberman (2001)) in a defined contribution pension
scheme whose fund is invested in n assets.
Then, considering the particular case of a 2-asset portfolio, we have investigated the financial risks
of a DC scheme, considering the investment risk borne by the member during the accumulation
period up to retirement and the annuity risk arising when the fund is converted into an annuity at
retirement.
We have analysed numerically the investment allocation and the downside risk faced by the retiring
member, where approximately optimal investment strategies have been adopted (or “sub-optimal”
investment strategies, due to the fact that we have added the constraint that short selling is not
allowed). The behaviour of the optimal investment strategy has been analysed allowing for changes
in the disutility function (via the parameter α ). Three different risk measures have been considered
in analysing the final net replacement ratios achieved by the member: the probability of failing the
target, the mean shortfall and a Value at Risk measure. We have considered the relationship
between the risk aversion of the member and these different risk measures in order to understand
better the choices confronting different categories of scheme member. We have also considered the
sensitivity of the results to the level of the correlation coefficient ρ  between the two asset returns.
The main results of our investigation are the following:
• The optimal investment strategy to be adopted by a risk averse member of a defined
contribution pension scheme is the so-called lifestyle strategy, which consists in investing the
whole fund in high risk assets at the beginning of the membership, and then switching into low
risk assets some years prior to retirement. The point in time when the switch occurs depends on
both the risk aversion of the individual (the more risk averse, the sooner the switch) and the time
to retirement (the longer the accumulation period, the later the switch).
• The optimal investment strategy for a risk neutral member of a defined contribution pension
scheme is to invest the whole fund in high risk assets for the whole period of membership, and
never switch into low risk assets.
• The different risk measures of the downside risk faced by the member of a defined contribution
pension scheme give different and contradictory indications.
•  Looking at the results for the probability of failing the target, the conclusion seems to be that
increasing the risk aversion of the individual or (which is the same) adopting more cautious
strategies leads to a greater number of failures relative to a target, chosen a priori.
• Looking at the results for the mean shortfall, the conclusion seems to be that increasing the risk
aversion of the individual or (which is the same) adopting more cautious strategies leads to
slightly lower mean shortfall, which means more limited reductions in pensioner income when a
failure occurs.
• Looking at the VaR results, we note that the VaR at 1%, 5% and 10% level does not change
very much when changing the risk aversion of the individual.
• The effect of changing the correlation factor ρ between the assets is very small both on the
optimal investment strategy and on the downside risk borne by the member of the scheme.
• The annuity risk borne by the member is underlined both by the behaviour of the VaR (with
VaR values of bn being always higher than VaR values of bnt), which shows that poor
outcomes are more adverse when a variable conversion factor is used to buy the annuity, and by
the observed distributions of bn and bnt (for example, the mode of the distribution being higher
in the bn case than in the bnt case).
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We suggest that the risk profile of the individual and the trade-off between different risk measures
of the downside risk borne by the member (for example, the number of failures and size of failures
in respect of a certain target), are important factors to be taken into consideration when determining
the choice of investment strategies in defined contribution pension schemes.
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APPENDIX
SKETCH OF THE PROOF
We want to prove that there are some sequences of coefficients {Pt}t, {Qt}t and {Rt}t such that:
(A1) ttt
2
ttt RfQ2fP)t,f(J +−=
for t = 0, 1 , 2,…N.
We show this by induction.
INDUCTION BASIS
For t=N (A1) is true. In fact,
(A2) J(fN, N) = CN = θ )]fF()fF[( NN2NN −α+−
And therefore:
PN = θ
QN = θ FN - α/2
RN = θ FN2 + α FN
INDUCTION STEP
Let us assume that (A1) is true for t+1, i.e.:
(A3) 1t1t1t
2
1t1t1t RfQ2fP)1t,f(J ++++++ +−=+
for some coefficients Pt+1, Qt+1 and Rt+1.
We will now show that (A1) is then true also for t.
By application of Bellmann’s principle (see 3.10 above), we obtain:
(A4) ]]f|)1t,f(J[E)fF()fF[(min)t,f(J t1ttt
2
tt}y{t 1n,...,1it
i +β+−α+−= +
−=
i.e.:
(A5) ]f|)1t,f(J[Emin)fF()fF()t,f(J t1t}y{tt
2
ttt
1n,...,1it
i +β+−α+−= +
−=
Applying the induction step, we have:
(A6) 1tt1t1tt
2
1t1tt1t R]ff[EQ2]ff[EP]f)1t,f(J[E ++++++ +−=+
Considering now the expression for ft (see 2.1 above), we have:
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(A7) E[ft+1 ]f t  = (ft + c) 
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By replacing terms in (A6), we get:
(A9) ]f)1t,f(J[E t1t ++ = Ψ (y1, y2, ..., yn-1)
(we omit the index t for convenience of notation).
We now solve the optimisation problem:
(A10)
1n1 y,...,y
min
−
Ψ (y1, y2, ..., yn-1)
and we find the gradient of Ψ, ∇Ψ, and set it equal to 0:
−
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∂
Ψ∂
ky
0, for k = 1, 2, ..., n-1 yields:
∑
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for k = 1, 2, ..., n-1. (A12)
We have now to solve the linear system with n-1 unknowns and n-1 equations:
(A13) A y = h
with:
(A14) A = ( aij )i,j=1,…,n-1
(A15) aij = E[(Wi − Wn) (Wj − Wn)]
(A16) y = (y1, y2, …, yn-1)
T
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(A17) h = (h1, h2, …, hn-1)
T
(A18) hi = ii
t1t
1t db
)cf(P
Q
−
++
+
(A19) bi = E[(Wi − Wn)] and b = (b1, b2, …, bn-1)
T
(A20) di = E(Wi Wn) − E(Wn
2
) and d = (d1, d2, …, dn-1)
T
We note that the Hessian matrix of Ψ is the matrix A, so we have now to prove the following
lemma:
LEMMA
The matrix A, as defined by (A14) and (A15), is positive definite.
Proof.
A is positive definite if and only if:
v
T
 A v > 0  for any vector v = (v1, v2, …vn-1)T.
Let us define:
Zi := Wi − Wn  for i = 1,…,n-1, then:
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 A v = 0 if and only if the random variable ∑−
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ii vZ  is identically zero, i.e. if and only if:
(A22) ∑−
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The proof proceeds by contradiction.
If (A22) is true, then:
(A23) 
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which means:
(A24)
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≡ ∑
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1n
1i
i
1n
1i
ii
n
v
Wv
W
so, Wn would be the weighted average of n-1 lognormal random variable, which is impossible, as
Wn itself is a lognormal random variable. Hence, we have a contradiction.
Therefore, A is definite positive.
The system (A13) has a unique solution given by:
(A25)
A
A
y i*i = i = 1, 2, …, n-1
where Ai is the determinant of the matrix obtained by A, replacing the ith column with the vector h.
Then, the following holds:
(A26) yt
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Q
k
t1t
1t
t
+
=
+
+ , Bi is the determinant of the matrix obtained by A, replacing the ith column
with the vector b, and Di is the determinant of the matrix obtained by A, replacing the ith column
with the vector d.
Since A is definite positive, )y,...y,y(y
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=  is the minimum of ψ:
(A27)
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min
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Ψ (y1, y2, ..., yn-1) = ψ (y1*, y2*, ..., yn-1*)
(where we omit the index t for convenience of notation).
By replacing the values of y1
*
, y2
*
, ..., yn-1
*
 obtained, we get:
(A28) ψ (y1*, y2*, ..., yn-1*) = Lt ft2 + Mt ft + Nt
where:
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which is (A1).
